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The current article explores status as an antecedent of procedural fairness effects (the findings that
perceived procedural fairness affects people’s reactions, e.g., their relational judgments). On the basis of
the literature, the authors proposed that salience of the general concept of status leads people to be more
attentive to procedural fairness information and that, as a consequence, stronger procedural fairness
effects should be found. In correspondence with this hypothesis, Experiment 1 showed stronger proce-
dural fairness effects on people’s relational treatment evaluations in a status salient condition compared
with a control condition. Experiment 2 replicated this effect and, in further correspondence with the
hypothesis, showed that status salience led to increased cognitive accessibility of fairness concerns.
Implications for the psychology of procedural justice are discussed.
Social justice is an unquestionable aspect of human life (see,
e.g., Folger, 1984). Human behavior and the choices people make
in life are strongly affected by what is fair to people and what is
morally desirable (cf. Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker,
1975). One fairness concern that people have is related to the
distribution of outcomes: People want to receive fair outcomes.
Social psychologists have therefore studied what outcomes people
perceive to be fair. This has been labeled the psychology of
distributive justice (e.g., Adams, 1965; Homans, 1974). Another
fairness concern that people have is related to decision-making
processes: People want the procedures that lead to decisions or
outcome distributions to be fair. The study of people’s reactions to
procedures has been labeled the psychology of procedural justice
(for overviews, see Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Cropanzano,
Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998;
Greenberg, 1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975,
1978; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler & Smith,
1998; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). The distinction between dis-
tributive justice and procedural justice is important, because the
classic work of Thibaut and Walker (1975) has shown that social
justice concerns indeed involve questions about both the fairness
of outcomes and the fairness of procedures.
An important factor to explain the psychology of both distrib-
utive justice and procedural justice is social status (e.g., Cropan-
zano, Rupp, Mohler, & Schminke, in press). The relation between
status and distributive justice has been argued to depend on per-
ceptions of entitlement (Feather, 1994). People perceive outcomes
to be fair if they think that they are entitled to those outcomes, and
social status (operationalized by Feather as relative standing com-
pared with other people) can determine whether people perceive
themselves as entitled to certain outcomes. As a consequence,
people may sometimes perceive differences in outcomes (e.g.,
salaries) as fair depending in part on differences in status positions
(e.g., full professors vs. assistant professors). Status thus can exert
a strong influence on people’s distributive justice perceptions.
Several authors have suggested that social status not only is
important in the distributive justice domain but is a crucial factor
in the procedural justice domain as well (Cropanzano et al., in
press; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind, 2001; Lind & Tyler,
1988; Tyler, 1989, 1994; Tyler & Blader, 2000, in press; Tyler &
Lind, 1992). However, we argue here that the current literature has
not been very explicit about the precise role of status in the
psychology of procedural justice. That is, we propose that (a)
procedural justice researchers have defined status in various ways,
(b) the data addressing the relation between status and procedural
justice are not conclusive, and (c) the underlying psychological
processes of how status is related to procedural justice are not
understood as well as may be possible. These shortcomings in the
literature are unfortunate, we argue here, because status is a
fundamental concept in important procedural justice theories (Lind
& Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). In the current article, there-
fore, we study the relation between status and procedural justice.
Below, we first provide a review of the literature on procedural
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justice and status. After this, we lay out the specific aims of the
current research.
Procedural Justice and Status
One of the most important findings in procedural justice re-
search is that perceived procedural fairness positively affects a
wide range of people’s perceptions and behaviors, such as rela-
tional treatment evaluations and affective reactions (Lind & Tyler,
1988). In the current article, we refer to these findings as examples
of procedural fairness effects. An illustration of procedural fair-
ness effects can be found in people’s reactions following voice as
opposed to no-voice procedures: People tend to rate procedures
that allow them an opportunity to voice their opinions to be more
fair than procedures that do not allow them such an opportunity
(Folger, 1977; Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran, 1979; see
also Brockner et al., 1998; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990). Numer-
ous studies have indicated that voice affects many other reactions
as well (for overviews, see Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind &
Tyler, 1988). For example, voice procedures have a positive in-
fluence on people’s perceptions of their relations with authorities
and on their affective reactions. Such procedural fairness effects
are very robust and easily generalize across methodologies and
samples (e.g., Folger et al., 1979; Greenberg & Folger, 1983; Lind
& Tyler, 1988; Van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, & Vermunt, 1998).
One of the most prominent theoretical perspectives that has
recognized status to be important to an understanding of proce-
dural fairness effects is the relational model of authority (Tyler &
Lind, 1992; see also Lind & Tyler, 1988). Inspired by social
identity theory, this model assumes that people attach importance
to being valued members of the social groups they belong to (cf.
Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The relational model argues that, as a
consequence, people search for information about the extent to
which they are respected and valued by their group members. To
this end, people pay particular attention to the way in which they
are treated by relevant group authorities, because group authorities
tend to be regarded as representatives for their group (Tyler &
Lind, 1992). Hence, fair procedures by group authorities may
indicate that one is valued and respected as a group member
(Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996).
On the basis of the relational model, Tyler (1989, 1994) argued
that people search for information about whether the authority
regards them as having a high or a low status position in the group.
People infer such information from the way authorities treat them:
If an authority treats people respectfully, people infer that the
authority regards them as having high status in the group. If an
authority treats people rudely, people infer that the authority re-
gards them as having low status in the group. This information
about status subsequently affects people’s perceptions of proce-
dural justice and should therefore lead to stronger procedural
fairness effects. In this way, the relational model suggests a fun-
damental and causal relation between status and procedural fair-
ness effects. The relational model assumes that procedures affect
the emergence of status differentials, and it assumes that status
differentials affect the perception of procedural treatments. The
present study focuses on the latter assumed causal relation.
Information about one’s intragroup status position has often
been referred to as status recognition or standing (e.g., Tyler, 1989,
1994). But are status recognition and standing really the same
thing? Lind (2001) emphasized that the concept of standing, as
described in the original work on the relational model (Lind &
Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992), should be defined as the extent
to which people perceive themselves as included in valued social
groups, independent of relative intragroup status differences. Re-
lated to this, Cropanzano et al. (in press) argued that, broadly
speaking, procedural justice scholars have used at least two defi-
nitions of status, one referring to relative intragroup differences
(cf. Tyler, 1989, 1994) and one referring to matters of inclusion
(cf. Lind, 2001).
This distinction corresponds to what Tyler and Blader (in press)
recently have labeled comparative status and autonomous status.
According to these authors, comparative status refers to status
based on social comparison processes and is based on external
standards such as differences in performance. For example, high
achievers may gain higher regard from fellow group members than
low achievers. Autonomous status involves considerations of
where people stand in terms of the standards that define the group
and is based on internal standards such as values and norms (e.g.,
the extent to which people’s personal norms correspond to group
norms). For example, people who generally have the same atti-
tudes as fellow group members may gain higher regard from the
group members than people who hold attitudes different than those
of fellow group members. Given that Tyler and Blader (in press)
were the first to investigate this distinction in empirical procedural
justice research, it can be concluded that procedural justice re-
searchers have not consistently used the same concept when re-
ferring to status. Instead of further separating these different forms
of status, we argue here that it is important to get an idea of what
the common contribution of these different forms of status to the
procedural justice field may be. In the present article, we argue
that, at a more general level, different definitions of status have a
lot in common, as both autonomous and comparative status boil
down to people’s perceptions of the regard and approval they
receive from others.
Aside from definitions, we argue here that empirical research
has not collected conclusive data on the relation between status
and procedural justice. Although an elaborate overview of the
empirical work on status and procedural justice is beyond the
scope of the current article (for more complete descriptions, see
Cropanzano et al., in press; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind &
Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000), we discuss three empirical
studies that have directly assessed the relation between status and
procedural justice: Tyler (1989), Tyler (1994), and Tyler and
Blader (in press). The Tyler (1989, 1994) surveys both reported
positive correlations between status recognition and perceptions of
procedural justice. Furthermore, the Tyler and Blader (in press)
survey found that perceptions of both autonomous and compara-
tive status were associated with procedural justice judgments,
although this relationship was stronger for autonomous than for
comparative status judgments. These three studies are important
because they provide empirical support for the position that status
is related to people’s reactions to procedural fairness. Furthermore,
the Tyler and Blader (in press) findings are interesting because the
positive correlations of both autonomous and comparative status
with procedural justice judgments suggest that, even though sev-
eral types of social status can be distinguished, these types are, at
least to some extent, related to procedural fairness effects. This
further underscores the prominent role that status may play in the
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psychology of procedural fairness effects and strongly suggests
that people may associate status with procedural justice.
In both the Tyler (1989) and the Tyler (1994) surveys, however,
the author measured status by asking participants whether author-
ities had been polite to respondents and had shown respect for their
rights. Furthermore, in the Tyler and Blader (in press) survey,
status was operationalized as perceptions of pride and respect.
Although we would certainly expect relations between perceptions
of status and these operationalizations, it can be argued that these
operationalizations do not measure status as directly as may be
possible. Furthermore, these studies report correlational data to
demonstrate the relation between status and perceptions of proce-
dural justice. As a consequence, we cannot be sure about the
causality of the relation between status and procedural fairness
effects, and, additionally, we have little knowledge about the
psychological processes that explain the relation between status
and procedural justice.
The Present Research
In the present research project, we directly study the causal
effects of status on people’s reactions toward fair and unfair
procedures. We do so by adopting a broad definition of status: lay
people’s own constructions of the general concept of status. Al-
though several definitions and operationalizations of status have
been used in the literature (Cropanzano et al., 2001; Lind, 2001;
Tyler & Blader, in press), we argue here that these definitions have
a lot in common at a broad level: All definitions of status have to
do with the regard and approval that people receive from others.
As a result, focusing people on their own constructions of the
general concept of status should provide a good starting point to
study the psychology of procedural fairness effects. We return to
this in the General Discussion.
Following the argument that the general concept of status has to
do with the regard and approval that people receive from other
people (cf. Tyler et al., 1996), we argue here that cognitive
accessibility of the general concept of status (e.g., because of
feedback about one’s status position, or because one has just
answered questions about status in a survey) may lead to an
increased concern for such regard and approval. In situations in
which information about status is made cognitively accessible,
people therefore seek cues that may inform them about how they
are held in regard by others. Building on the relational model
(Tyler & Lind, 1992), we argue here that this status-related infor-
mation may be found in procedural fairness information. After all,
the relational model has argued that people use procedural fairness
information to make inferences about status-related issues such as
the extent to which they are held in high regard by others in
interpersonal encounters (Tyler & Lind, 1992; see also Lind &
Tyler, 1988). As a result, in situations in which status concerns are
made cognitively accessible, people may become relatively more
attentive to procedural fairness information, compared with situa-
tions in which status concerns are not made accessible.
The reasoning that increased accessibility of status concerns
makes people more attentive to fairness information suggests that
there may be a cognitive connection between the general con-
structs of status and fairness. More specifically, we argue that
people have mental representations of the concepts of status and
fairness and that there is a cognitive link, or mental association,
between these representations, such that representations of status
affect representations of fairness. Therefore, in situations in which
the concept of status is activated, people’s fairness concerns should
become more accessible. Activation of the general concept of
status may therefore lead people to be more attentive to fairness
information and, as a consequence, to react more strongly to fair as
opposed to unfair procedures.
On the basis of this, we propose that cognitively activating the
general concept of status leads to stronger reactions toward fair
and unfair procedures. We investigated this idea in two experi-
ments by manipulating the salience of the general concept of
status. We did this with a minimal salience manipulation: In both
experiments, we asked participants to answer two simple, open-
ended questions about the general concept of status. This manip-
ulation of status salience was followed by a manipulation of
procedural justice. We hypothesized that participants would show
stronger procedural fairness effects in status salient conditions than
in control conditions.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 we tested this hypothesis by manipulating
status salience with two open-ended questions that asked partici-
pants about the general concept of status in the experimental
condition and that asked participants about a nonstatus issue in the
control condition. Furthermore, we manipulated procedure by
varying whether the experimenter allowed participants an oppor-
tunity to voice their opinions in a decision-making process (e.g.,
Folger et al., 1979). Relational treatment evaluations are important
dependent variables in the procedural justice domain (Lind &
Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992; cf. Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind,
1996; Smith & Tyler, 1997; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, Wilke, &
Lind, 2001). We therefore investigated our hypothesis on three
typical relational treatment evaluations: We asked participants
whether they thought the experimenter had respect for them,
trusted them, and treated them politely (cf. Tyler, 1994).
Method
Participants and design. We tested our hypotheses in a 2 (status
salience: salient vs. control)  2 (procedure: voice vs. no voice) factorial
design. A total of 116 students at the Free University Amsterdam (27
men, 89 women), varying in age from 18 to 41 years, voluntarily partici-
pated in the experiment. The experiment was preceded by one experiment
and followed by another, unrelated experiment. The experiments lasted
approximately 90 min, and participants were paid 20 Dutch guilders for
participation.
Procedure. On arrival at the laboratory, participants were led to 1 of 15
separate cubicles. In the cubicles, participants found a computer mouse, a
keyboard, and a computer screen, equipment that was used to present the
stimulus information and to collect the data. Furthermore, participants
found a piece of paper and a pen in the cubicles. They were then informed
that the computers in the laboratory were connected to each other and that
the experimenter could send messages to the participants by means of the
computer network (in reality, all stimulus information was prepro-
grammed, an experimental procedure none of the participants objected to
on debriefing). Furthermore, participants were told that a lottery with a
prize of 100 Dutch guilders would be held among every 50 participants.
Participants were informed that a total of 200 lottery tickets would be
divided among every 50 participants and that the experimenter would
allocate some of these lottery tickets to the participants.
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After this, we induced the manipulation of status salience. In the status
salient condition, participants were asked to respond to two open-ended
questions concerning their thoughts and emotions about the concept status
(cf. Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000). Specifically,
participants were asked to write down on the piece of paper next to the
computer their answers to the questions “Please describe briefly the
thoughts and emotions that come to mind when you think of the concept
status” and “Please describe a situation out of your own life in which status
played a role.” Participants in the control condition were posed two similar
questions referring to something that is not related to status: watching TV
(cf. Van den Bos, 2001). Thus, participants in the control condition were
asked to respond to the questions “Please describe briefly the thoughts and
emotions that come to mind when you think of the concept watching TV”
and “Please describe a situation out of your own life in which watching TV
played a role.” After this manipulation, all participants completed the
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Telle-
gen, 1988). This measure served as a filler task and to assess whether the
status salience manipulation engendered positive affect (PA) or negative
affect (NA; cf. Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000). The
PANAS consists of 20 items referring to how participants feel at the
moment and can be divided into two subscales: one 10-item subscale
measuring PA (  .82) and one 10-item subscale measuring NA ( 
.92).
Following the PANAS scale, we induced the manipulation of procedure.
Participants in the voice condition received a message from the experi-
menter that they were allowed an opportunity to voice their opinion about
what percentage of the lottery tickets they felt they should receive. These
participants were subsequently asked to type in this percentage. Partici-
pants in the no-voice condition received a message from the experimenter
that they were not allowed an opportunity to voice their opinion about what
percentage of the lottery tickets they felt they should receive, and they were
not asked to type in this percentage.
We then asked the questions pertaining to the dependent measures and
the manipulation checks. To assess participants’ relational treatment eval-
uations, we asked the following three questions: “Do you think that the
experimenter respects you?” (1  certainly not, 7  certainly), “Do you
think that the experimenter trusts you?” (1  certainly not, 7  certainly),
and “How politely did the experimenter treat you?” (1  not at all, 7 
very much). These three items were averaged into a reliable relational
treatment scale (  .84).
To check for the manipulation of status salience, we asked the following
two questions (1  not at all, 7  very much): “Did you think about the
concept status during this experiment?” and “To what extent did you think
about the concept status during this experiment?” These two items were
highly correlated (r  .88, p  .001), and we averaged them into a single
status check scale (  .93). To check for the procedure manipulation, we
assessed the following two items (1 not at all, 7 very much): “Did you
receive an opportunity to voice your opinion about the allocation of the
lottery tickets?” and “To what extent did the experimenter allow you an
opportunity to voice your opinion about the allocation of the lottery
tickets?” These two items were highly correlated (r  .82, p  .001), and
we averaged them into a reliable procedure check scale (  .90). Fur-
thermore, we checked the manipulation of procedural justice by posing the
following two questions: “How fair was the procedure used to divide the
lottery tickets?” (1  very unfair, 7  very fair) and “How just was the
procedure used to divide the lottery tickets?” (1  very unjust, 7  very
just). These two items were highly correlated (r  .79, p  .001), and we
averaged them into a reliable procedural justice scale (  .88). After this,
participants were thoroughly debriefed, thanked, and paid for their
participation.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation checks. We checked the experimental manipu-
lations with 2 2 univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs). The
ANOVA on the status check scale showed only a significant main
effect of status, F(1, 112)  60.59, p  .001. Participants in the
status salient condition indicated that they had thought more about
the concept status (M  4.94, SD  1.77) than did participants in
the control condition (M  2.50, SD  1.59). These findings
indicate that the manipulation of status salience was successful in
affecting the relative strength of participants’ thoughts about sta-
tus, as was intended with this manipulation.
The analysis on the procedure check scale yielded only a sig-
nificant main effect of procedure, F(1, 112)  495.70, p  .001.
Participants in the voice condition indicated that they had per-
ceived more opportunities to voice their opinions (M  6.39,
SD  0.92) than did participants in the no-voice condition
(M 1.81, SD 1.27). From these analyses, we can conclude that
the participants had perceived the experimental manipulations as
intended.
We then analyzed participants’ procedural justice judgments. As
expected, this analysis showed only a significant procedure main
effect, F(1, 112)  39.54, p  .001. Participants in the voice
condition rated the procedure to be more fair (M  4.97,
SD  1.69) than did participants in the no-voice condition
(M 3.07, SD 1.54). In correspondence with previous research,
manipulating voice as opposed to no-voice procedures was a
successful operationalization of procedural justice.
PANAS findings. The PANAS was included in the experiment
to rule out the possibility that our status salience manipulation may
have caused unintentional affective reactions. A multivariate
ANOVA (MANOVA) on the PA and NA scales showed no
significant main or interaction effects at either the multivariate
level or the univariate levels (overall means and standard devia-
tions: PA scale, M  4.50, SD  0.83; NA scale, M  2.09,
SD  1.09). This shows that, as expected, the status salience
manipulation had no effects on participants’ positive or negative
affective reactions. Thus, the effects reported here cannot be
attributed to affective reactions following status salience.
Relational treatment evaluations. An ANOVA on the rela-
tional treatment scale yielded significant main effects of proce-
dure, F(1, 112)  77.60, p  .001, and status salience, F(1,
112) 6.20, p .02; these effects were qualified by the predicted
interaction effect, F(1, 112)  4.59, p  .04. The cell means and
standard deviations are presented in Table 1. As predicted, the
effect of procedure was stronger when status was salient, F(1,
112)  58.00, p  .001, 2  .34, than when status was not
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Participants’ Relational
Treatment Evaluations as a Function of Status Salience and
Procedure (Experiment 1)
Procedure
Status salience
TV salient Status salient
M SD M SD
Voice 5.28 0.92 5.20 0.70
No voice 3.87 1.32 2.89 1.45
Note. Means are on 7-point scales, with higher values indicating more
positive relational treatment evaluations.
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salient, F(1, 112)  23.58, p  .001, 2  .17. Thus, participants’
relational treatment evaluations were more strongly affected by the
procedure manipulation in the status salient condition than in the
control condition.
Additionally, it can be noted here that the effect of status
salience was nonsignificant in the voice condition (F  1.00), and
significant in the no-voice condition, F(1, 112)  9.94, p  .01.
We come back to this in the General Discussion.
These results support the prediction that salience of the general
concept status enhances procedural fairness effects. Before we
draw strong conclusions, however, it is important to replicate the
current findings in a second experiment. An additional aim of the
second experiment was to test a basic assumption of our hypoth-
esis: the assumption that cognitively activating the general concept
status makes fairness concerns more accessible. As an extension of
our research, we wanted to know whether this assumption is
correct. We therefore included cognitive activation measures as
manipulation checks to find out whether status salience really
made fairness concerns more accessible.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 we induced the same status salience manipu-
lation as in Experiment 1. Following this, participants completed a
word-fragment completion task. In this task, participants were
presented with uncompleted Dutch words that could be completed
either as fairness-related or as nonfairness-related words. Word-
fragment completion tasks are widely interpreted as unobtrusive
measures of construct accessibility (e.g., Chen, Lee-Chai, &
Bargh, 2001). The word-fragment completion task, therefore,
served as a manipulation check of whether status salience made
fairness concerns more accessible: We expected that participants
in the status salient condition would come up with more fairness-
related words than would participants in the control condition.
In Experiment 2 we tried to replicate the findings of Experi-
ment 1. To do so, we wanted to test whether our predictions would
be supported if we presented the status salience manipulation as
fully unrelated to the procedure manipulation. We therefore pre-
sented Experiment 2 to the participants as two separate studies.
The status salience manipulation, the PANAS, and the word-
fragment completion task were included in the first study. After
this, we manipulated procedure in a scenario experiment, which
was presented as a second, unrelated study.
To ascertain whether our results may generalize to other opera-
tionalizations of procedural justice, we decided to induce a differ-
ent procedural justice manipulation than in Experiment 1. That is,
in Experiment 2 we manipulated procedural accuracy (Leventhal,
1980): The authority either did or did not take all relevant infor-
mation into account to come to a decision. This manipulation has
been shown to be an alternative way to study procedural fairness
effects (Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000; Van
den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997): People tend to rate accurate
procedures to be more fair than inaccurate procedures. Further-
more, manipulations of procedural accuracy affect the same range
of people’s reactions as do manipulations of voice, and, thus, they
may produce procedural fairness effects (cf. Van den Bos et al.,
1997).
In Experiment 2 we again assessed relational treatment evalu-
ations as dependent measures. To have an indication of the robust-
ness of our findings, we also measured participants’ ratings of
satisfaction with the procedure (Lind & Tyler, 1988). We expected
that participants’ relational treatment evaluations and procedural
satisfaction ratings would both be affected more strongly by ac-
curate as opposed to inaccurate procedures if status had been made
salient than if status had not been made salient.
Method
Participants and design. We tested our predictions in a 2 (status
salience: salient vs. control)  2 (procedure: accurate vs. inaccurate)
factorial design. Participants were 88 students from the Free University
Amsterdam (38 men, 50 women), varying in age from 18 to 41 years. We
asked whether participants had participated in Experiment 1. An affirma-
tive answer to this question would have disqualified them for participation.
The experiment was followed by another, unrelated experiment. The ex-
periments lasted a total of 50 min. Participants were recruited on a
voluntary basis and were paid 12.50 Dutch guilders for participation.
Procedure. On arrival at the laboratory, participants were seated in the
same individual cubicles as in Experiment 1. In the cubicles, participants
again found a computer screen, which was used to present the stimulus
information; a keyboard; and a computer mouse. The experiment was
presented to the participants as two unrelated studies. “Study 1” then
started, in which participants responded to the questions pertaining to the
status salience manipulation, the PANAS, and the word-fragment comple-
tion task. The status salience manipulation was the same as in Experi-
ment 1, except that participants typed in their answers on the computer
rather than wrote down their answers by means of paper and pencil. After
this, participants again responded to the 20 items of the PANAS scale
(Watson et al., 1988). The 10 items measuring PA were averaged into a
reliable PA scale ( .78), and the 10 items measuring NA were averaged
into a reliable NA scale (  .88).
So that we could check for the status salience manipulation, participants
then performed the word-fragment completion task. Participants were
presented with a total of 20 uncompleted Dutch words. In all cases, several
correct answers were possible. For each uncompleted word, participants
were asked to make one Dutch word. This word had to consist of two, and
sometimes of three, syllables. Participants had to type this word into the
computer, after which a new word was presented. Of the 20 uncompleted
Dutch words, 14 were filler words. The remaining 6 words were con-
structed in such a way that participants could logically come up with
fairness-related and nonfairness-related words. For example, participants
were asked to construct a word of two syllables that ended with lijk. Pilot
testing revealed that participants could come up with the Dutch fairness-
related word eerlijk (fair) but also with Dutch nonfairness-related words,
such as vrolijk (cheerful) or lelijk (ugly). Another example is the following:
Participants were asked to make a word of two syllables that ends with
nrecht. Pilot testing revealed that participants could come up with the
fairness-related Dutch word onrecht (unjust) but also with the nonfairness-
related word aanrecht (kitchen sink). The 6 fairness-related words (trans-
lated in English) that participants could come up with were fair, unjust,
respect, unequal, honest, and impolite. For each participant, we counted the
total number of fairness-related words that the participant had typed in.
Following the word-fragment completion task, participants were in-
formed that Study 1 had ended and that they would start Study 2, which
was presented as unrelated to Study 1. We then asked participants to
imagine the following situation:
You are an employee at an ironware factory. Because of a financial
windfall, the management has decided to give every employee a
one-time only financial bonus. In order to assess the magnitude of
your bonus, the management has made a total evaluation of your
work. Within your work you have 10 different activities.
After this, we induced the procedure manipulation:
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You find out that the management has taken your performance of 10
out of your 10 [1 out of your 10] activities into account to make a total
evaluation of your work.
After this, participants were asked to answer the questions that consti-
tuted the dependent variables and the manipulation checks. As in Experi-
ment 1, we collected participants’ relational treatment evaluations. Because
two out of the three relational treatment evaluation items that were assessed
in Experiment 1 contained key words that participants could have come up
with in the word-completion task that they just had completed (i.e., respect
and [im]polite), it was important to use different items than in Experiment 1
for this measure. To keep our relational treatment evaluations measure
unrelated to other operationalizations used in the current experiment, we
asked the following three questions (1  not at all, 7  very much): “To
what extent do you think that the management is partial?” (recoded), “To
what extent do you think that the management is objective?”, and “To what
extent do you have trust in the management?” (cf. Tyler, 1989). These three
items were averaged into one reliable relational treatment evaluations scale
(  .70). To get an indication of the robustness of our findings, we also
asked the following question to measure participants’ procedural satisfac-
tion (1  not at all, 7  very much): “How satisfied are you with the
procedure used to make a total evaluation of your work?”
To check the status salience manipulation, we asked the same two
questions as in Experiment 1. Again, these items were highly correlated
(r  .87, p  .001), and we averaged them into a reliable status salience
scale (  .93). Furthermore, to check whether procedural accuracy was a
successful manipulation of procedural justice, we assessed the following
two procedural justice judgments: “How fair was the procedure used to
make a total evaluation of your work?” (1 very unfair, 7 very fair) and
“How just was the procedure used to make a total evaluation of your
work?” (1  very unjust, 7  very just). These two items were highly
correlated (r  .98, p  .001), and we averaged them into a reliable
procedural justice scale (  .99). After this, the experiment ended.
Participants were thoroughly debriefed, thanked, and paid for their
participation.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation checks. The manipulations were checked with
2 2 ANOVAs. The ANOVA on the status salience scale showed
only a main effect of status salience, F(1, 84)  26.10, p  .001.
Participants in the status salient condition indicated that they had
thought more about the concept status (M 4.57, SD 1.72) than
did participants in the control condition (M 2.71, SD 1.72). In
correspondence with Experiment 1, these findings indicate that the
manipulation of status salience was successful in affecting the
relative strength of participants’ thoughts about status, as was
intended with this manipulation.
To further check the status salience manipulation, we then
analyzed the word-fragment completions. This analysis showed
only a significant main effect of status salience, F(1, 84)  5.91,
p  .02. As predicted, participants in the status salient condition
came up with more fairness-related words (M  2.44, SD  0.96)
than did participants in the control condition (M  1.98,
SD  0.84). These findings are supportive of the proposition that
the status salience manipulation makes fairness concerns more
accessible.1 It therefore can be concluded that the status salience
manipulation was perceived as intended.
The analysis on the procedural justice scale showed only a
significant main effect of procedure, F(1, 84)  315.99, p  .001.
As expected, participants in the accurate conditions rated the
procedure to be more fair (M  6.15, SD  1.04) than did
participants in the inaccurate condition (M  1.88, SD  1.22). In
correspondence with previous research (e.g., Van den Bos et al.,
1997), manipulating procedural accuracy was a successful opera-
tionalization of procedural justice. On the basis of these findings,
it can be concluded that the experimental manipulations were
successful.
PANAS findings. A 2  2 MANOVA on the PA and NA
scales showed no significant main effects or interactions at either
the multivariate level or the univariate levels (overall means and
standard deviations: PA scale, M  4.57, SD  0.75; NA scale,
M  2.13, SD  0.93). In correspondence with Experiment 1, this
shows that the status salience manipulation had no effects on
participants’ ratings of PA or NA. Thus, effects of the status
salience manipulations cannot be attributed to participants’ affec-
tive reactions following their thoughts about status.
Relational treatment evaluations. A 2  2 ANOVA on par-
ticipants’ relational treatment evaluations showed a significant
main effect of procedure, F(1, 84) 27.81, p .001, an effect that
was qualified by the predicted interaction effect, F(1, 84)  4.07,
p  .05. The cell means and standard deviations are shown in the
upper half of Table 2. As predicted, the effect of procedure was
stronger in the status salient condition, F(1, 84) 25.78, p .001,
2  .24, than in the control condition, F(1, 84)  5.51, p  .03,
2 .06. This shows that, as predicted and in correspondence with
the results of Experiment 1, participants’ relational treatment eval-
uations were more strongly affected by the procedure manipulation
in the status salient condition that in the control condition.
As an aside, it can be noted here that the effect of status salience
was significant in the accurate condition, F(1, 84) 4.94, p .03,
but not in the inaccurate condition (F  1.00). We come back to
this in the General Discussion.
Procedural satisfaction judgments. A 2  2 ANOVA on par-
ticipants’ procedural satisfaction judgments yielded a significant
main effect of procedure, F(1, 84)  125.90, p  .001, an effect
that was qualified by the predicted interaction effect, F(1,
84)  5.08, p  .03. The cell means and standard deviations are
depicted in the lower half of Table 2. As expected, the effect of
procedure was stronger in the status salient condition, F(1,
84)  88.70, p  .001, 2  .51, than in the control condition,
F(1, 84) 41.15, p .001, 2 .33. On the basis of these results,
we conclude that our prediction can also be found on participants’
procedural satisfaction judgments.
It can further be noted here that the effects of status salience
were nonsignificant both in the accurate condition, F(1,
84)  2.28, and in the inaccurate condition, F(1, 84)  1.73. We
come back to this in the General Discussion.
General Discussion
Both experiments show that procedural fairness effects are en-
hanced when status has been made salient compared with when
status has not been made salient. Further evidence for our hypoth-
1 We also analyzed the completions of the four words that were most
explicitly fairness words (fair, unjust, unequal, honest). This analysis
showed a significant main effect of status salience only, F(1, 84)  7.72,
p  .01. Participants in the status salient condition came up with more
fairness-related words (M  2.23, SD  0.90) than did participants in the
control condition (M  1.76, SD  0 .77).
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esis was found in Experiment 2, in which we presented cognitive
activation data showing that status salience led to increased acces-
sibility of fairness concerns. This suggests that people are more
attentive to fairness information and are more strongly affected by
perceived procedural fairness following questions about status
than following questions about nonstatus issues. In other words,
status salience makes people’s fairness concerns more accessible.
We have pointed out that a minimal salience operationalization
of the broad term status (i.e., as lay people perceive it) may be
important at this point in the research literature to investigate
procedural fairness effects. That is, although researchers have
specified several definitions of status (e.g., Cropanzano et al., in
press; Lind, 2001; Tyler & Blader, in press), we argue that, at a
broad level, these definitions have a lot in common. We were
therefore interested in the answers that participants in the status
salient conditions gave to the status questions (the answers of
participants in the control condition were not related to the concept
status). Inspection of participants’ answers to these questions in
both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 shows that lay people, when
thinking about status, generally think about the regard and ap-
proval that they receive from others. Furthermore, the distinction
among different types of status (e.g., autonomous vs. comparative
status; Tyler & Blader, in press) seems to refer to different bases
for such regard and approval: People can receive regard and
approval from others because of internal characteristics, such as
their norms and values, or because of external characteristics, such
as performances. (An illustrative answer one of the participants
gave was the following: “the regard and approval that people
receive because of their character, or because of the amount of
money they have.”) This suggests that, although there may be
different definitions of status, because status can be based on
various qualities of a person, at a more general level these defini-
tions have to do with the regard and approval that individuals
receive from other people.
We think that the current finding that status salience enhances
procedural fairness effects provides new insights into the relation
between status and procedural justice. That is, although the rela-
tional model assumes a causal relation between status and proce-
dural fairness effects, empirical work on this topic has only re-
ported correlational data (see, e.g., Tyler, 1989, 1994; Tyler &
Blader, in press). In the current study we have reported evidence
for the causal order that is most central in the relational model
(Tyler & Lind, 1992). Although this does not rule out the possi-
bility that procedural justice affects perceptions of status as well,
the present experiments do support the prediction that status sa-
lience affects people’s reactions to perceived procedural justice.
Additionally, it should be noted here that the relational model is
somewhat ambiguous about whether the relation between status
and procedural fairness effects is moderating or mediating in
nature. Building on Tyler and Lind’s (1992) discussion of the
relational model, we were very well able to infer that status may
moderate procedural fairness effects. However, in several empir-
ical articles on the relational model (Tyler, 1989, 1994), it has been
argued that status information may shape procedural justice judg-
ments and subsequent procedural fairness effects, thus assuming a
mediational relation between status and procedural fairness effects.
In the current research we have demonstrated that status salience
may moderate procedural fairness effects. Future research would
do well to explore whether evidence for the mediational relation
may be found as well.
It is important to note here that previous work on status and
fairness was focused on the importance of status to understand
social justice phenomena without explicitly concentrating on sa-
lience (e.g., Cropanzano et al., in press; Feather, 1994; Lind, 2001;
Tyler & Blader, in press), whereas the current article explicitly
explores the effects of status salience. By investigating whether
salience of the general concept status is sufficient to affect proce-
dural fairness effects, we tried to investigate the psychology of the
effects of procedural fairness information on variables such as
people’s relational treatment evaluations and their satisfaction with
procedures. The fact that status salience was enough to affect
procedural fairness effects suggests, in our opinion, that the rela-
tion between status and procedural justice may be more deeply
rooted in people’s minds than has been recognized before. We
hope that the current findings may add to a better understanding of
how status is related to fairness.
Several social justice researchers have argued that it is important
to investigate the underlying cognitive processes with which peo-
ple decide how to react to procedural justice issues (Ambrose &
Kulik, 2001; Cropanzano et al., 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Van
den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002; Van den Bos &
Miedema, 2000). Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, only
recently have a few social justice researchers attempted to collect
cognitive process data (Hafer, 2000; Miedema, Van den Bos, &
Vermunt, 2000; Steiner, Guirard, & Baccino, 1999; Van den Bos
& Van Prooijen, 2001). In Experiment 2, we developed a measure
of fairness accessibility based on the social cognition literature
(e.g., Chen et al., 2001). These data show that cognitive accessi-
bility effects may operate in people’s processing of fairness infor-
mation. We therefore think that an important avenue for future
research is applying social cognition methodologies to investigate
social justice processes. More specifically, future research should
be oriented toward integrating group dynamics with the cognitive
processes that underlie people’s reactions to perceived procedural
fairness (Van den Bos et al., 1997; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, &
Wilke, 2001). This may deepen scientists’ understanding of the
psychology of procedural fairness effects.
In Experiment 1, we found that the effects of status salience
especially affected participants’ relational treatment evaluations
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Participants’ Relational
Treatment Evaluations and Procedural Satisfaction Ratings as a
Function of Status Salience and Procedure (Experiment 2)
Dependent variable
Status salience
TV salient Status salient
M SD M SD
Relational treatment evaluations
Accurate procedure 4.55 1.07 5.35 0.73
Inaccurate procedure 3.75 1.14 3.58 1.48
Procedural satisfaction ratings
Accurate procedure 5.09 1.69 5.81 1.25
Inaccurate procedure 2.44 1.38 1.82 1.18
Note. Means are on 7-point scales, with higher values indicating more
positive ratings on the dependent variable in question.
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following unfair (no-voice) procedures and not following fair
(voice) procedures. In Experiment 2, however, we found that status
salience affected participants’ relational treatment evaluations fol-
lowing fair (accurate) procedures and not following unfair (inac-
curate) procedures and did not lead to significant differences
within procedure conditions on participants’ ratings of procedural
satisfaction. On the basis of the present data, it cannot be stated
with certainty whether status salience mainly affects people’s
reactions following fair or following unfair procedures: After all,
we were able to find effects of status salience following both fair
(Experiment 2) and unfair (Experiment 1) procedures. This may
have to do with different psychological impacts of the different
operationalizations of procedural justice and the different depen-
dent variables in the two experiments. Future researchers may
want to find out when reactions to fair versus to unfair procedures
are affected as a function of status salience manipulations. More
important for the present purposes, however, was the fact that the
hypothesis that people are more strongly affected by procedural
justice manipulations in a status salient condition than in a control
condition was supported in both experiments presented here.
We tested our hypothesis both in an experiential experiment in
which participants really experienced procedural justice (Experi-
ment 1) and, so that we could present status salience as fully
unrelated to the procedure manipulation, in a scenario experiment
(Experiment 2). Furthermore, we used different operationaliza-
tions of procedure. Converging evidence across the experiments
suggests that the findings reported here are robust and may gen-
eralize to different methodologies. This conclusion is further un-
derscored by the notion that in Experiment 2 we not only repli-
cated the effects on relational treatment evaluations but also found
the hypothesized effects on procedural satisfaction ratings. Thus,
the effects of status salience on procedural fairness effects can be
found for different types of people’s reactions following various
types of procedures.
Recent procedural justice experiments have shown that proce-
dural fairness effects were enhanced in situations in which people
had thought about things that made them feel uncertain (Van den
Bos, 2001; see also Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000). We argue
here that the findings reported in the current article are unrelated to
these uncertainty salience issues. First, there was no indication in
participants’ answers to the status questions that thinking of status
made them feel uncertain. Second, and more important, we re-
cently conducted a series of experiments on intragroup status
differences and procedural fairness effects (Van Prooijen, Van den
Bos, & Wilke, 2002). In these studies we manipulated participants’
intragroup status (high, average, low, and unknown). In correspon-
dence with the findings reported in the current article, the results
showed that information about intragroup status (which thereby
made status a salient issue to participants: the high, average, and
low intragroup status conditions) led to stronger procedural fair-
ness effects than in the status unknown condition. In other words,
we found stronger procedural fairness effects when participants
were certain about their intragroup status than when participants
were uncertain about their intragroup status. These findings clearly
contradict the position that the enhancing effects of status on
reactions to procedures may have to do with human uncertainty.
An additional point to discuss when interpreting the current
findings is the potential role of culture. The Netherlands can be
conceived of as an egalitarian society, and it could be the case that
status differences are generally seen as unfair. It might therefore be
argued that the current status salience findings are specific for
egalitarian societies in which status salience leads people to re-
member unfair events. However, we found no evidence in partic-
ipants’ answers to the status questions that they perceived status
differences as unfair or that they remembered unfair events. Ad-
ditionally, in a 2 (word valence)  2 (status salience)  2 (pro-
cedure) ANOVA on the word-fragment completion data (with
word valence included as a within-subject factor), we only found
the predicted main effect of status salience and could not find
significant differences in participants’ completions of positive
(fairness-related) versus negative (nonfairness-related) words. Fur-
thermore, all interactions in this analysis were nonsignificant. This
shows that status salience did not remind participants of unfairness
only. Finally, in the intragroup status experiments described above
(Van Prooijen et al., 2002), we manipulated intragroup status by
varying participants’ own contributions to a group task relative to
other group members’ contributions. Although this operationaliza-
tion of status clearly is not an unfair event, we found results that
are in correspondence with the current findings. From all this, we
infer that the current findings cannot be explained by the assump-
tion that Dutch people perceive status to be an unfair construct and
that it is more appropriate to focus on the process status salience
may activate fairness concerns.
In closing, we think that it is safe to conclude that the present
study has shown new insights into the psychology of status and
procedural justice. We have studied how status affects the cogni-
tive processing of fairness information by arguing that salience of
the general concept status leads people to be more attentive to
subsequent procedure information, which is reflected in an en-
hancement of procedural fairness effects. This suggests that status
salience leads to an enhanced accessibility of fairness concerns, a
view supported by cognitive process data. It can be concluded,
therefore, that status salience is an important antecedent of proce-
dural fairness effects.
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